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AVIATION LAW - WARSAW CONVENTION LIABILITY PRINCIPLES Ex-
TEND TO DAMAGE FROM TERRORIST ATTACK
On August 5, 1973, plaintiff and other passengers had formed a line in
the transit lounge of Hellenikon Airport in Athens, Greece, to allow the
local police to conduct a baggage check and physical search. Before plain-
tiff could complete the required processing and begin her flight to New
York on defendant TransWorld Airlines, two Jordanian terrorists entered
the terminal and launched a grenade and gunfire attack that left three
TransWorld Airlines passengers dead and forty wounded. The terrorists
held 32 persons hostage before their surrender to police some two hours
later. Plaintiff, suing in tort for personal injuries received in the attack,
moved for summary judgment on the ground that, under the liability pro-
visions of the Warsaw Convention' as modified in accordance with the
Montreal Agreement,2 defendant was liable without fault. Defendant, a
signatory to the Montreal Agreement, moved for summary judgment on
the ground that the Warsaw system was not applicable to the facts of the
present case.3 Held, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment granted. The
absolute liability provisions of the Warsaw system extend, as a matter of
law, to the time when passengers have begun to perform the uninterrupted
sequence of activities that are prerequisites to the boarding of the aircraft.
Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afl'd,
528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
An examination of the historical context indicates that one of the two
fundamental policies that led to the drafting of the Warsaw Convention
in 1929 was the belief that airlines engaged in international transportation
should be provided some measure of protection to assist them in coping
with the known and unknown perils that threatened their existence as a
viable industry.4 In particular there was a belief that if an airline were held
Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, done, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1935), T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (effective for
United States Oct. 29, 1934) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
2 Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept.
23, 1971, [1971] 24 U.S.T. 564, T.IA.S. No. 3570 (effective for United States Jan. 26, 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Montreal Agreement]. Greece is also a party to the Montreal Agree-
ment. The Warsaw Convention, as modified in accordance with the Montreal Agreement, will
be hereinafter referred to as the Warsaw system. The contract provisions dealing with the
increases in liability are set out at 31 FED. REG. 7302.
3 Day v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd 528 F.2d 31
(2d Cir. 1975). It was not disputed that plaintiff was a passenger in "international transporta-
tion" as defined in Article (1) paragraph (2) of the Warsaw Convention. Under these provi-
sions the ticket-holder on a flight beginning and terminating within the borders of two
countries that adhere to the Convention is a passenger in "international transportation."
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
I Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as Husserl]; Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention,
80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 499-500 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld].
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to the same measure of liability as were other common carriers, then sev-
eral major air crashes generating vast numbers of plaintiffs, would soon
deplete the assets of the enterprise and discourage the capital investment
necessary for the growth of the industry.' This concern resulted in several
provisions that have become the essence of the Warsaw Convention. Under
these provisions the liability of the carrier for the death or bodily injury of
a passenger was limited to a sum certain,' and several defenses were estab-
lished whereby the carrier might escape liability altogether.'
The other fundamental policy underlying the Warsaw Convention was
the desire to effectuate a speedy, inexpensive, and relatively simple recov-
ery by the plaintiff injured in international air travel.8 The injured passen-
ger faced the very real prospects of great expense, delay, and inconveni-
ence, possibly resulting in inadequate compensation or no recovery at all.
To avoid such injustice, the Warsaw Convention contains provisions ena-
bling the plaintiff to bring suit in any one of several forums,9 and it relieves
him of the necessity of showing negligence.'0
Subsequent proposals for revision of the Warsaw provisions were based
upon the growing realization that air travel was becoming much safer and
that the maximum allowable recovery was woefully inadequate to compen-
sate the victim of an air crash." These proposals resulted in the signing of
the Hague Protocol in 1955,12 which doubled the permissible amount of
See Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 499.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22, para. 1. This provides that the liability of the
carrier is limited to approximately $8,300.
1 Id. art. 20, para. 1. This section provides that the carrier is not liable if he proves that he
and his agents have taken all the necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for him to take such measures. Art. 21 relieves the carrier of liability if he can
prove contributory negligence on the part of the passenger.
' See Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 519-22. Prior to the Convention the plaintiff was faced
with formidable obstacles to recovery. He might be forced to bring suit in another nation; or
if able to bring suit in his own state, foreign law might still be determinative due to the
traditional conflict of laws principle which states that recovery is to be governed by the law
of the place where the tort occurred. Masci v. Young, 289 U.S. 253 (1933); Calkins, The Cause
of Action Under the Warsaw Convention, 26 J. AIR L. & COMM. 217 (1959). But in any forum
there could be insuperable problems of proof. It would be difficult indeed for the plaintiff to
prove negligence on the part of the carrier in an era when the cause of many air accidents
was unknown. See generally, W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 39 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSERI.
I Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 26, para. 1. The plaintiff may bring his action in
any one of four possible forums, provided that the forum is in a country which adheres to the
Convention: (1) the domicile of the carrier; (2) its principal place of business; (3) the place
of business through which the contract was made; (4) the place of destination.
"' Id., art. 17. This provides that "the carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the
event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury. . .if the accident
which caused the damage. . .took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking."
See Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 546-52.
72 CIVIL AERONAUTIcs BOARD, AERONAUTICAL STATUrES AND RELATED MATERIAL 324-66 (1963).
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recovery. 3 The United States did not sign the Hague Protocol, presumably
believing that the proposed increase in the amount of recovery, although
helpful in a small way, was still insufficient." In November of 1965 the
United States formally denounced the Warsaw Convention;' before the
denunciation became effective, however, the United States withdrew the
notice and announced approval of the Montreal Agreement.'" This was an
interim agreement" requiring airlines to file with the Civil Aeronautics
Board tariffs which raised the limit of liability and waived the defenses
allowed by article (20) paragraph (1) of the Convention.'" Further, it incor-
porated all the other provisions of the Convention, including those provi-
sions which imposed liability without fault on the carrier.' 9
It seems to be settled in New York that the Warsaw system does not
create a cause of action. Rather, it merely furnishes a presumption of
liability and places a limit on that liability, leaving it to the otherwise
applicable substantive law to provide the cause of action.2 " The preamble
to the Convention states, however, that its purpose is to regulate "in a
uniform manner the conditions of international transportation by air in
respect of the documents used for such transportation and of the liability
of the carrier .... '"' The Convention, in order to achieve this objective,
states that "any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought
subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention. '2  Thus, the
Convention has been held not to limit the kind of cause of action on which
relief may be granted, but only to subject such action to its provisions.2 3
Assuming that principles of tort law can supply the cause of action upon
which the Convention's presumptions of liability operate, the extent to
which air carriers are liable for injury to passengers under the common law
should be examined. As is the case with common carriers generally," the
air carrier has a duty to exercise a high degree of care for passenger safety.2 5
'3 Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 504-09.
11 Id. at 509-16.
" Husserl, supra note 4, at 1241 n.2; see Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 546-52.
" Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 596.
" See note 2 supra.
" See note 7 supra.
" The Montreal Agreement was expressly stated to be a special contract under article 22(1)
of the Warsaw Convention to incorporate these other provisions. Husserl, supra note 4, at 1241
n.2; Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 597.
" Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
907 (1957); Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
rev 'd on other grounds 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954); Husserl,
supra note 14, at 1243.
21 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, preamble.
22 Id. art. 24 (emphasis added).
21 Husserl, supra note 4, at 1245.
" Reuter v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 226 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1955); see cases collected in
Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 346, 358-59 (1960).
21 Nieves v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, 31 App. Div. 2d 359,
297 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1st Dept. 1969); see cases cited in note 26 infra.
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This duty not only includes the protection of passengers from foreseeable
hazards while they are on board the craft,"' but also extends to passengers
in the act of boarding or alighting from the craft, 2" or passengers who are
merely "on the premises" of the airport.m
The absolute liability furnished by the Warsaw system, once a cause of
action in tort or contract is found upon which to base the claim, is applica-
ble in suits for death or bodily injury sustained "on board the aircraft or
in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. '"2
Resolution of the present case depends upon the meaning of the phrase "in
the course of any of the operations of embarking."0
The Warsaw system has become a part of the federal law of the United
States,3' and as such, its precise meaning is a question of law.32 The initial
focus in the construction of a treaty is on the text of the treaty itself,3 but
the analysis is then sharpened by reference to the historical background
and purposes underlying the document.u These principles of construction
2' See cases collected in Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 379 (1960) (liability for injuries caused by air
turbulence); 75 A.L.R.2d 848 (1961) (liability for injuries caused by change in air pressure);
and Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1172 (1953) (liability for injuries caused by improper maintenance).
7' Weller v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 239 Minn. 298, 58 N.W.2d 739 (1953); see cases
collected in Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1113 (1958).
2' See cases collected in Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 1938. In Delta Air Lines v. Millirons, 87 Ga.
App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1952), defendant airline was held liable for the injuries sustained
by plaintiff from a fall in a poorly lit parking lot of the airport. This quote is representative
of the cases examined: "A carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers but it owes
to its passengers only the duty of exercising ordinary care for their protection while on their
premises and while the relationship of carrier and passenger exists." Id. at 337.
2 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17. See note 12 supra for the text of this article.
There are no cases dealing withthe applicability of the Warsaw system to injuries
suffered while "embarking," but there are two cases concerned with "disembarking." Mac-
Donald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971); Felismina v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc.,
13 Av. Cas. 17,145 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) held that the operation of disembarking had ended when
the passenger had exited the plane and reached a position of safety within the terminal.
In the MacDonald case the focus was primarily upon the meaning of the word "accident."
In fact the plaintiff in that case did not succeed in her suit for injuries sustained when she
tripped and fell over a small zipper bag in the floor because of her failure to show an
accident-"the first requirement for invocation of the Convention." Id. at 1404. Any bag in
front of her must have been clearly evident, the court reasoned, so there was no reason to
say the bag caused the fall. This writer believes that the crux of the somewhat confusing
language is that the suit failed because of plaintiff's failure to show the requisite proximate
cause.
The MacDonald court adds that even though the passenger has disembarked, "... he
may remain in the status of a passenger of a carrier while inside the building." Id. at 1405.
This seems to imply that the passenger might maintain a suit in tort independently of the
Warsaw remedies.
' Husserl, supra note 4, at 1249.
2 See generally Rosman v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 314
N.E.2d 848, 852 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rosman].
' Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, open for signature, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/Cont. 39/27, art. 31.
" Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943), MacDonald, supra note 30, at 1402.
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are demonstrated in those hijacking cases which dealt with the question
of recovery for psychosomatic injury and concluded that such injury was,
as a matter of law, within the intention of the Convention. 5
One factual circumstance common to both the hijacking cases and the
present case is that the injury complained of was caused by the violent
actions of third parties. This fact, however, does not present a significant
issue in either group of cases. 31 Instead, the important element in these two
groupings is that each of them presents a novel question: whether the
Warsaw system applies to a certain type of harm (in the hijacking cases)
and whether it applies to injuries occurring at a certain point in time (in
the instant case). The hijacking cases are relevant as an analogy; they show
how one novel issue has been resolved by the courts.
A treaty is to be construed liberally so as to give effect to its underlying
purposes.3 7 To construe the liability provisions of the Warsaw system so
broadly as to include the liability of the carrier for psychosomatic injuries
would be to facilitate both of the basic objectives of the Convention.3 9 If
such injuries were held to be nonactionable under the Warsaw system,
then, in an independent tort suit, not only would the passenger be denied
the benefits of absolute liability, but the carrier might be subject to unlim-
ited liability. The Warsaw system evidences an intent to include all the
possible causes of action that might be brought against a carrier.'" If the
drafters simply did not foresee a cause of action for mental harm, then the
Warsaw System should be construed to include such causes of action.'
Based on these considerations and enabled by New York case precedent
to recognize a cause of action for mental trauma, at least when accompa-
nied by physical manifestations, 42 the hijacking cases held that such
trauma gave rise to a cause of action in tort that was actionable under the
provisions of the Warsaw system. 3
3S Husserl, supra note 4, at 1243; Rosman, supra note 32, at 857; 6 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
339 (1976).
1' The carrier is liable under the common law for those third party attacks upon its passen-
gers that it could have prevented by the exercise of reasonable care. See PROSSER, supra note
8, at 348-49 and cases cited therein.
This principle is stated in N.Y. JUR. Carriers 332, at 291 (1959).
It is important to note, once again, that lack of reasonable care would not have to be shown
for recovery under the Warsaw system.
', De Tenorio v. McGowan, 364 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Miss. 1973).
' The principal concern in the hijacking cases was the meaning of the phrase "bodily
injury," as used in art. 17, note 10 supra.
"' See Husserl, supra note 4, at 1247.
0 The causes of action are categorized according to injury to person (art. 17), damage to
baggage (art. 18), or damages to either person or baggage if caused by the carrier's delay (art.
19).
' Husserl, supra note 4, at 1248.
' Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729, (1961); Rosman,
supra note 32. The Husserl court went so far as to hold that mental injury alone was sufficient
for recovery.
" Husserl, supra note 4, Rosman, supra note 32. Rosman and Herman v. TransWorld
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In concluding that the provisions of the Warsaw Convention and Mon-
treal Agreement were applicable to the particular facts of the case before
it, the court did not attempt to establish an inflexible rule that would
control carrier liability in all subsequent cases of this nature. The court
restricted itself "to the totality of the circumstances affecting these plain-
tiffs, viewed against the background of the plain meaning of the Conven-
tion, coupled with a consideration of its historical purposes.""
Since the Convention does not expressly define article 17 liability provi-
sions,45 the court looked to the ordinary meaning of the phrase "in the
course of any of the operations of embarking." Of crucial importance was
the fact that these ticket-holding passengers had completed five steps of
the eleven step procedure established by the defendant airline as a prere-
quisite to boarding and were lined up to perform the rest of the require-
ments at the time of the attack." Since plaintiffs were locked into a proce-
dure required by the defendant, they were engaged, within the plain mean-
ing of the phrase, "in the course of embarking." 7
Noting that treaties are to be liberally construed so as to carry out the
intention of the parties, the court attempted to bolster its interpretation
of the plain meaning of the provision in question by looking to the histori-
cal background of the Convention. 41 The court found that the drafters
meant to put narrower limits on the liability of the carrier for injury to
passengers than for injury to baggage. Since the passenger's exercise of
volition could lead to some dangerous situations that would not occur with
inanimate articles, it would be unfair to tax the carrier with responsibility
for the passenger's safety, as opposed to that of the baggage, from the time
of his entry into the airport to the time he boarded the aircraft. Therefore,
the phrase in question was adopted to limit the carrier's liability "to those
times when a passenger is exposed to the dangers of aviation."49 Because
these passengers were engaged in a "purposeful activity" getting ready to
embark, they had exposed themselves to dangers falling within the protec-
tion of the Convention.
The court also believed that the air carrier was the most efficient risk
bearer and risk distributor in situations such as the instant case. It is the
Airlines, Inc., were consolidated and the Court of Appeals heard the two together.
393 F. Supp. 217, 222.
" See note 10 supra.
Plaintiffs had already obtained boarding passes, baggage checks, seat assignments, and
had already passed through passport and currency clearance at the time of the attack. The
final steps involved submitting to a search, walking out the gate, riding a bus to the aircraft,
and going aboard.
" The Felismina case, supra note 30, was distinguished. The Warsaw system was not
applicable to that plaintiff because she had left the aircraft and was not required to perform
any further activities as a condition of ending her journey.
" 393 F. Supp. at 222; Sullivan, Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International
Convention 7 J. AIR LAW 1, 18-22 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan].
" Id. Apparently the court thought that being bombed by criminals in the transit lounge
of an airport was one of the "dangers of aviation."
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carrier who is best able to acquire insurance and raise its tariffs accord-
ingly. It is the carrier, also, who is in a position to press the airport owner
to install safety devices to prevent the entry of armed terrorists into the
airport terminal. 50
Finally, the court looked to principles of common law as a point of
comparison with liability under the Warsaw system. In particular, it noted
that under the New York common law the responsibility of the carrier
extends to proper maintenance of the areas of the terminal expected to be
used by embarking passengers, even if such terminal does not belong to
the airline."
The instant decision is not a surprising one, in view of the Husserl5
opinion rendered by the same court some two months earlier. However, it
appears that the Day decision does not extend its substantive reach quite
as far as does Husserl. Husserl held that mental anguish sustained on
board an aircraft while parked in a desert is compensable under the War-
saw system. The instant case, although it also involves injury caused by
third party criminals, at least involves a type of injury-physical-that
was clearly and expressly within the contemplation of the Convention
drafters.53 The only really novel fact presented by this case is that the
injury occurred at a point in time and procedure rather far removed from
the actual boarding of the plane. This presents a question of first
impression, and it must be conceded that, on the basis of analogous reason-
ing, the court's resolution of the question seems technically to be in good
order.
The holding necessitates no extreme convolution of the "operations of
embarking" provisions" in order to fit the plaintiffs within the purview of
such provisions. But in order to sustain its "plain meaning" analysis, the
court examines the legislative history surrounding the convention and de-
termines that the carrier should be liable only for injuries sustained from
"dangers of aviation." 5
However, the court made no attempt to specify the "dangers of avia-
tion." Instead the court attempted to define such dangers by marking off
the perimeters of the phrase "in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking.""6 Should the passenger's injury arise while
he was engaged in such operations, then that passenger's injuries arose out
of a "danger of aviation."" In equating "dangers of aviation" with those
I Id. at 220.
" Id. at 223.
52 See note 4 supra.
393 F. Supp. at 220.
See note 10 supra.
393 F. Supp. at 222. For an analysis of the history of the Convention, see Sullivan, note
48 supra.
393 F. Supp. at 220.
The dangers would be those that arise during the period which begins sometime after
the passenger enters the terminal. These would be those confronting a passenger while per-
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risks which arise in the "operations of embarking," the analysis overlooks
the argument that the danger of terrorist attack is not a danger that is
unique to or inherent in travel by air, and a danger which could not be
expected to arise, for example, in the depot of a railway or the terminal of
a busline. It is true that one motivation underlying the recent rash of
terrorism is the desire for international publicity,18 and this desire can
perhaps be readily realized at the expense of the air carrier. But to say that
political terrorism is a problem most often directed toward the air carrier
is not to say that it is a problem which is expected in travel by air and
one which the Warsaw drafters would readily have embraced.
The realization that a major air crash could severely impair the financial
integrity of the airline was one of the fundamental motivations underlying
the drafting of the Convention." To the extent that an accident giving rise
to innumerable plaintiffs with unlimited claims was mainly the concern
of carriers by air, as opposed to other common carriers, perhaps the airline
industry was entitled to this special protection. However, it must be recog-
nized that whatever remains of the justification for giving special treat-
ment to carriers by air, the fact is that they are given such treatment.
Thus, the Day court was not faced with justifying such favoritism, which
is embodied in a document having the force of federal law, but only with
the essentially equitable issue of whether to include within such document
one more class of injury-causing activities. In addition, application of the
Warsaw system may very well benefit the passenger more than the airline
in many cases, especially where, as here, it would be extremely difficult
for plaintiff to prove negligence. 0
The court's examination of the extent of carrier liability in common law
tort furnished a better basis for its decision than did its classification of
•terrorism as a "danger of aviation." The Convention drafters wanted so
much to facilitate the compensation of the injured plaintiff to the extent
that they were willing to remove the requirement of a showing of fault from
the proceeding.61 Looking at this aspect of the Warsaw system, one is
compelled to conclude that its remedial procedures go even further than
does the common law in consoling the plaintiff. This is an important policy
expression because once a court has met its initial burden of stretching,
forming those activities that the carrier requires him to perform as a condition of beginning
or completing his journey.
Id. at 219.
, It was foreseeable in 1929, the airline industry being in its technological infancy, that
serious accidents, many unexplainable, were certain to occur. Accidents killing and wounding
scores of plaintiffs could be said to inhere in this novel enterprise. It was with this in mind
that the drafters provided the enterprise the special protection of limited liability for injuries
arising out of the "dangers of aviation." Id. at 220.
"o The court acknowledged the plaintiff's difficulty in its first footnote, by saying that
plaintiff's independent claims grounded on negligence had little factual basis, since the air
terminal was not owned by the defendant, but by the Greek government. Id. at 218.
, Id. at 221.
1976] 607
608 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 6:581
pushing, or pulling a class of injuries into the letter of the Warsaw provi-
sions, it can step back and find support for its decision by pointing out
some vague notions of policy. This seems to be the procedure followed in
the Day decision.
But the fundamental purposes of the Warsaw system do seem persuasive
in a case such as this which involves the question of whether or not to fit
a group of actions into a remedial system when such actions are already
poised on the very perimeter of that system. Clearly the plaintiff in the
instant case had a cause of action in common law tort and theoretically
could have recovered independently of the Warsaw remedies upon a show-
ing of negligence. The court, then, merely drew upon the Convention's
"underlying purposes" to relieve plaintiff of that burden.2 This seems a
radical maneuver in view of the fact that it took plaintiff all the way from
a possible nonsuit to a summary judgment in her favor. But this idea is,
after all, no more radical than the Warsaw system itself.
The notion that the Warswaw system functions to redistribute the risks
of air travel was an important basis of the Day decision. 3 Perhaps it is true
that the airlines are the better risk bearers. Perhaps, too, the airline can
successfully negotiate with the airport owner, persuading him to install
security devices to keep the terrorists out, as he has had to do to keep the
hijackers off the planes. But it is interesting to surmise what the courts will
do when the installation of such devices force the terrorists to bring their
attacks in the parking lot, or at the entrance gate to the parking lot, or in
the streets outside. Will the court still insist that this is a "danger of
aviation" as contemplated by the Warsaw system? Or will it decide that
fault must again become the basis of liability?
Whatever the decision, a court can find support for it by emphasizing
one or the other of the twin purposes of the Warsaw system. In fact, it could
be argued that the courts should attempt to protect the airline industry
by not taxing it with responsibility for terrorist attacks at all. But there is
the additional objective of facilitating recovery. The importance of the
instant decision is that it underscores the shift of emphasis from the early
equality of these two principles to the modern desire to compensate the
injured plaintiff at the expense of the more efficient risk bearer." In a
ruling that reflects the tension inherent in a system that seeks uniformity
62 Id. at 222.
I' d. at 220.
The Day decision and the hijacking cases perhaps are based on a recognition that the
airline industry has grown out of its infancy, both technologically and financially. If air
carriers are superior risk-bearers, and the modern plaintiff does have a much better chance
of showing that negligence and not an act of God caused an accident, then it might be argued
that their relationship no longer needs the special protection furnished it by the Warsaw
system. But this ignores the other beneficial aspects of the system-quicker, more convenient
and less expensive litigation-that would be lost in a total denunciation of the Convention.
See Lowenfeld, supra note 4 at 519-22.
The alternative to total denunciation is amply demonstrated by the instant decision.
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on the one hand and flexibility on the other, the Day court has shown how
the changing focus of policy can result in subtle shifts in the responsibility
for loss. The underlying theme of the decision is stated by Justice Cardozo
in another context: "The principle .. .does not change, but the things
subject to the principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in
a changing civilization require them to be."65
Leon Adams, Jr.
' MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
